Surprising fact: by 2026, many advanced users report cutting back on traditional antivirus because isolating threats stops more attacks than signature scans alone.
You will see why a shift toward isolation and least privilege matters. Modern platforms can create a small, hardened root of trust that runs separate from the main operating system. This reduces the blast radius when something gets past file scanning.
VBS and memory integrity are often enabled by default on current machines, and support goes back to Windows 10 and Server 2016. That matters because many attackers aim for persistence and credential theft, not just a one-time payload.
This guide shows which built-in features to enable first, how to confirm they are running, and what hardware or firmware you need. You’ll learn practical steps for consumer and small-business PCs in the United States, with real-world performance trade-offs.
Goal: treat antivirus as one defensive layer, not the foundation. By the end, you’ll understand how a trusted, isolated layer leads to stronger protection for your most sensitive paths.
Key Takeaways
- Isolation and least privilege reduce damage from breaches.
- Built-in features can serve as a trusted root for the OS.
- Verify defaults like memory integrity on modern devices.
- Antivirus remains useful, but is not the only layer.
- Practical steps fit both consumer and small-business PCs in the U.S.
Why seasoned Windows users are shifting from traditional antivirus to built-in isolation
Experienced operators place boundaries around key processes to limit what a breach can touch.
How modern attacks target the kernel, drivers, and credentials—not just files
Attackers increasingly aim at the kernel and kernel mode pathways to gain deep system control. They exploit vulnerable drivers or read credential material in memory. Once they get kernel-level execution or valid credentials, they can move laterally and take over other devices on your network.
What “assume the OS can be compromised” means for your security strategy
Assume compromise means you plan as if something will land inside the OS. You then add isolation boundaries and integrity checks so a single process or stolen credential cannot access everything.
Where antivirus still helps and where built-in features reduce dependence
Antivirus still catches commodity malware, phishing droppers, and known bad binaries. It helps against common threats and unwanted apps.
Built-in features like VBS and Credential Guard use the hypervisor to isolate authentication data and limit spread. Those protections lower dependence on signature-only tools for novel exploits, living-off-the-land attacks, and kernel abuse.
Windows virtualization-based security (VBS) explained in plain English
Think of VBS as a small, guarded workshop inside your PC’s memory where critical checks run away from everyday apps. The system uses the windows hypervisor to carve out that protected area so sensitive tasks and secret stores live separate from the main OS.
This is not about running a separate desktop VM for apps. Instead, the goal is to isolate code integrity checks, credential protection, and other trusted services inside a locked runtime environment.
Call that locked area a root of trust. If an attacker compromises one process, they cannot easily reach credential material, kernel secrets, or the integrity services that guard the system.
Support begins with windows 10 and windows server 2016, and windows 11 often ships with key protections on by default. Later you’ll learn how to tell the difference between “vbs enabled” and actually running.
| What VBS isolates | Why it matters | Where it runs | How to check |
|---|---|---|---|
| Credential stores | Prevents easy theft after process compromise | Main RAM in a protected environment | msinfo32 shows “Running” |
| Integrity checks | Keeps kernel mode code validated | Hypervisor-backed runtime | PowerShell DeviceGuard queries |
| Protected services | Reduces lateral movement | Isolated memory region | OS feature status: vbs enabled vs running |
windows virtualization security features you should enable first
Start by hardening anything that stores or verifies credentials; that reduces the most dangerous post-compromise moves.
Credential Guard for protecting logins and mitigating pass-the-hash style theft
Credential Guard isolates your login secrets in a protected memory region. This makes pass-the-hash and similar theft far harder, even if malware gets elevated rights.
Device Guard and code integrity controls to block untrusted code
Device Guard is best thought of as modern code integrity controls. Enable policies that block unsigned drivers and untrusted code rather than relying on defaults alone.
Secure Boot and UEFI firmware to ensure trusted startup components
Turn on Secure Boot and use UEFI firmware locks to validate the boot chain. That reduces the chance a bootkit or tampered component runs before protections load.
Core isolation and memory integrity as the day-to-day “toggle” you’ll manage
Core isolation exposes a simple toggle labeled Memory Integrity in device settings. It is the most tangible HVCI step you’ll flip, but test drivers first to avoid compatibility issues.
Turn on Memory Integrity (HVCI) to harden kernel mode code integrity
Memory Integrity moves critical code integrity checks out of the main OS so attackers hit a tougher barrier.
What it protects: Memory Integrity runs kernel mode code integrity inside an isolated runtime. It prevents untrusted drivers and malicious system files from loading into protected memory. That reduces the chance a compromised process can corrupt kernel pages or inject code into kernel mode.
Enable it in your device: Open windows security → Device security → Core isolation details, then toggle Memory integrity on. Reboot when prompted. This simple path sets the integrity checks your device will enforce in memory.
At scale: Use Intune (Hypervisor Enforced Code Integrity), Group Policy (Turn on Virtualization Based Security), or set registry keys under HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\DeviceGuard\Scenarios\HypervisorEnforcedCodeIntegrity to enable via management tools.
UEFI lock and risks: Enabling an UEFI lock prevents remote disabling. Only use it after pilot testing, since some drivers can malfunction and, rarely, cause boot failure. Expect modest performance overhead on older hardware.
| Protection | Benefit | How to enable | Risks |
|---|---|---|---|
| Kernel mode code integrity | Blocks unsigned kernel code from loading | Windows Security → Device security → Core isolation → Memory integrity | Driver incompatibility, rare boot failure |
| Protected memory pages | Stops in-memory tampering | Enable via Intune/GPO/registry for fleets | Requires driver updates; test on pilots |
| Hypervisor-backed checks | Reduces attacker kernel escalation | Consider UEFI lock for permanent enforcement | Locking complicates future changes, may need BIOS access |
Confirm whether VBS is enabled and running on your PC
Check msinfo32 first. Open System Information (msinfo32) and look for the line labeled Virtualization-based security. If it shows Running, VBS is active and enforcing protections.
Quick interpretation
If msinfo32 shows Not enabled, the feature is not running. Sometimes a system reports “enabled” in settings but does not show “Running” due to missing firmware, disabled CPU virtualization, or incompatible drivers.
PowerShell verification for admins
Run:
Get-CimInstance -ClassName Win32_DeviceGuard -Namespace root\Microsoft\Windows\DeviceGuard
and check VirtualizationBasedSecurityStatus. Values: 0 = not enabled, 1 = enabled but not running, 2 = enabled and running.
| Check | Command or UI | Key field |
|---|---|---|
| Single PC quick | msinfo32 → find line | Virtualization-based security: Running / Not enabled |
| Detailed status | PowerShell Get-CimInstance Win32_DeviceGuard | VirtualizationBasedSecurityStatus (0/1/2) |
| Fleet or VMs | Script Get-CimInstance remotely | Compare SecurityServicesConfigured vs SecurityServicesRunning |
If VBS is not running, your next step is to confirm CPU virtualization, Secure Boot, and driver compatibility before retrying the feature toggle in Windows Security.
Meet the hardware and firmware requirements for VBS-enabled protection
Confirming the right hardware and firmware is the practical first step to get VBS working reliably on your PC.
VBS needs the host hypervisor and a processor that supports hardware virtualization and second-level address translation (SLAT). Without SLAT, the hypervisor cannot map protected memory efficiently and the environment may not run.
Why IOMMU and DMA device control matter
An IOMMU puts DMA-capable devices behind a translation layer. This helps block direct memory attacks from rogue peripherals, so isolation holds even when a device could otherwise access system RAM.
TPM 2.0 and what you still get without it
TPM 2.0 is recommended for stronger hardware-backed keys and credential protection. You still gain integrity and isolation benefits without a TPM, but credential strength is reduced.
UEFI, Secure Boot, and firmware hardening
UEFI plus Secure Boot locks the boot chain so threats cannot load before protections. Harden firmware (SMM mitigations, EFI memory protections) for added assurance.
- BIOS/UEFI checklist: enable Intel VT-x/AMD‑V, SLAT support, and allow the hypervisor to run.
- If it won’t run: update firmware, enable Secure Boot, update chipset drivers, and confirm device drivers are compatible.
Balance security with performance and compatibility in the real world
Balancing strong protections with usable performance matters for every PC you manage. Enabling deep integrity checks like memory integrity and virtualization-based security can add CPU and memory overhead. That overhead is most visible in gaming, large builds, and heavy I/O tasks.
Why performance changes: Hypervisor-backed checks add context switches and extra validation steps. Older processors without Mode-Based Execution Control emulate these paths and slow down more than newer chips.
Which CPUs handle HVCI best
Intel Kaby Lake and later (MBEC support) and AMD Zen 2 and later (GMET support) run HVCI with lower overhead. If you use older hardware, expect larger performance hits and test before wide rollout.
Safe rollback and recovery steps
If memory integrity causes driver crashes or prevents boot, use the Windows Recovery Environment to set the HypervisorEnforcedCodeIntegrity registry value to 0. If you locked UEFI, you may need to disable Secure Boot in firmware to recover.
How to disable when you must
First, turn off Memory Integrity in Core isolation under Windows Security and reboot. If VBS stays active, set HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\DeviceGuard\EnableVirtualizationBasedSecurity = 0 and restart. Confirm status in msinfo32.
| Issue | When it happens | Quick fix | Follow-up |
|---|---|---|---|
| Driver crash after enabling HVCI | Older drivers or unsigned kernel modules | Disable Memory Integrity, reboot to normal mode | Update drivers, re-test in pilot |
| System slowdowns | Heavy CPU or I/O workloads on older CPUs | Test performance with feature off, compare metrics | Consider staged rollout to newer hardware only |
| Unbootable after UEFI lock | Incompatible driver or firmware change | Use Windows RE to flip HVCI registry key; disable Secure Boot if required | Document change, plan firmware/driver updates before re-locking |
Conclusion
Practical protection starts by assuming part of the OS can be compromised and then limiting what that compromise can touch.
Minimum strong set: enable Secure Boot, turn on virtualization-based security features like Memory Integrity, enable Credential Guard where applicable, and apply code integrity and Device Guard policies to block untrusted modules.
Verify, don’t guess: check msinfo32 and query Win32_DeviceGuard so you know what is actually running. Expect tradeoffs—some machines need driver updates, tuning, and staged rollout to keep performance steady.
Next action: pick one device today, enable memory integrity if supported, confirm it shows as running, and expand that validated approach across your other machines.
FAQ
Why are some experienced users moving away from traditional antivirus software?
You’ll find that seasoned users often shift focus because modern attacks target the kernel, drivers, and credentials rather than just files. Built-in isolation and hypervisor-backed controls protect critical areas of the system even if a process is compromised, so you don’t rely solely on signature-based detection to stop advanced threats.
How do modern attacks target the kernel, drivers, and credentials?
Attackers aim for high-privilege components to persist and evade detection. By exploiting drivers or kernel flaws and stealing authentication secrets, they gain broad access. That’s why protecting memory, code integrity, and credential stores matters as much as scanning files.
What does “assume the OS can be compromised” mean for your security approach?
It means you design defenses that don’t trust the operating environment. You isolate critical secrets and enforce hardware-backed policies so even if an app or service is breached, sensitive assets remain protected by a separate, enforced layer.
Where does traditional antivirus still help, and where do built-in isolation features reduce dependence?
Antivirus still blocks known malware, phishing links, and risky files. Isolation features reduce dependence by protecting credentials, enforcing code integrity, and limiting kernel-level attacks. You’ll get the most protection by using both approaches together.
How does the hypervisor create an isolated environment in memory?
The hypervisor runs beneath the operating system and carves out a secure region of memory. That region enforces strict access controls, so protected components and secrets remain inaccessible to normal system software and drivers.
Why does hypervisor-backed isolation act as a “root of trust”?
Because it enforces policies outside the reach of the OS kernel. That external enforcement establishes a hardware-supported trust anchor, so code integrity and secrets are verified independently from potentially compromised system software.
How does isolation limit lateral movement after a process is compromised?
Isolation separates sensitive capabilities into a guarded environment. If an attacker controls one process, they can’t easily reach protected secrets, kernel services, or other processes guarded by the isolated layer, limiting what they can do.
Which OS versions support hypervisor-backed isolation, including Server 2016?
Support appears in recent client and server releases, including modern client editions and Server 2016 and later. Check your edition’s feature list and updates to confirm availability for your machine.
Which protection features should you enable first?
Start with credential protection for logins, device-level code integrity controls, secure startup firmware, and memory integrity. Those layers cover authentication, trusted code execution, trusted boot, and runtime kernel protections.
What does credential protection do for your logins?
It isolates authentication secrets so credential theft techniques such as pass-the-hash become much harder. Your account keys and tokens are kept in a guarded area that normal processes and drivers cannot access.
How do device-level code integrity controls help block untrusted code?
They enforce policies that allow only signed or trusted binaries and drivers to run in kernel mode. This prevents many forms of tampering and unauthorized extensions to core system components.
Why is Secure Boot and UEFI firmware important for trusted startup?
Secure startup ensures that only verified firmware and boot loaders run. That prevents low-level tampering and establishes a trusted chain before the OS and protection layers load.
What is core isolation and memory integrity, and why will you manage that toggle daily?
Core isolation is a runtime protection layer that includes memory integrity. Turning it on enforces stricter kernel code validation, protecting you from untrusted drivers and runtime tampering. You’ll toggle it when testing drivers or troubleshooting compatibility.
What does memory integrity protect in kernel mode?
It protects in-memory code and data structures from unauthorized modifications. That includes drivers and critical system components so attackers can’t easily inject or modify kernel-mode code.
How do you enable memory integrity in the security settings?
You can turn it on from Device security under Core isolation in the security app. The setting enforces hypervisor-backed code integrity for kernel-mode components on your machine.
How do you enable memory integrity at scale for many devices?
Deploy it via management tools like Intune with CSP, Group Policy templates, or scripted registry changes. Use testing rings to validate drivers and avoid widespread compatibility issues before full rollout.
When should you consider locking UEFI and what does that mean for future changes?
Locking UEFI prevents unauthorized firmware changes and enforces secure boot settings. Consider it when you need strict tamper resistance, but remember it can block firmware updates or driver changes unless you plan for administrative processes to manage exceptions.
What driver compatibility risks should you expect with memory integrity enabled?
Older or unsigned drivers may malfunction or cause boot issues. You might see rare failures during startup if a critical driver isn’t compatible. Test drivers beforehand and keep recovery tools ready.
How can you confirm the isolated protection layer is enabled and running?
Open System Information (msinfo32) and look for a line that reports the hypervisor-backed protection as running. That gives a quick status check to confirm the feature is active.
What PowerShell options help you verify configured versus running services?
Use PowerShell cmdlets and the Win32_DeviceGuard class to compare configured policies with the current runtime status. Those commands show whether protection is enforced or only configured but not active.
What hardware features must your machine have for hypervisor-backed protection?
You need CPU support for hardware-assisted virtualization and second-level address translation. Strong protection also benefits from IOMMU/DMA controls, TPM 2.0, and UEFI firmware with Secure Boot.
What role does IOMMU and DMA-capable device handling play?
IOMMU reduces direct memory access risks by isolating device DMA to allowed regions. That prevents peripheral-based attacks from reaching protected memory regions.
Do you need TPM 2.0 and what works without it?
TPM 2.0 strengthens attestation and key protection, but basic hypervisor-backed isolation can still provide protection without it. TPM improves recovery and hardware-rooted trust for keys and measurements.
Why do UEFI, Secure Boot, and hardened firmware settings matter?
They ensure the system starts in a known-good state and prevents low-level compromise. Hardened firmware reduces attack surface and supports the integrity of higher-layer protections.
How will enabling hypervisor-backed protections affect performance?
Some systems may see modest overhead, particularly on older CPUs. On newer generations you’ll often notice minimal impact because hardware optimizations handle the extra isolation efficiently.
Which CPU generations handle memory integrity better and why does that affect you?
Recent processors include features that accelerate second-level address translation and reduce context-switch costs. If your CPU is newer, you’ll typically get stronger protection with less performance penalty.
What safe rollback steps exist if memory integrity causes instability?
Boot into Windows Recovery Environment, disable the feature from troubleshooting options, or use a preconfigured recovery image. Keep driver backups and a restore plan to recover quickly.
How do you disable hypervisor-backed protection or memory integrity when necessary?
You can toggle Core isolation via the security app or change registry/Group Policy entries. For persistent issues, boot to recovery and adjust settings or use management tools to push a temporary disable for troubleshooting.